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1964] NOTES
excellent opportunity to correct the practices regarding recovery in
the slant-well suit. Use of the conversion theory of recovery and the
attendant measure of damages produces unfair results, either by over-
compensating a sole plaintiff or by subjecting a defendant to multiple
liability. It is time to replace the conversion theory with a realty
theory which will produce just and equitable results for all parties.
Don C. Nix
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents by Service of Process
Upon a Contractually Appointed Agent
I. INTRODUCTION
In personam jurisdiction over a defendant usually is acquired by
service of process upon the defendant within the territorial juris-
diction of the court or by his appearance in the proceedings before
the court.' Jurisdiction over the person is necessary to the rendition
of a judgment which personally binds the defendant.! A party may
confer jurisdiction over his person by express or implied consent.'
Consent may be implied from certain acts such as driving an automo-
bile," committing a tort,' or "doing business" within a state.' Express
consent may be given by the appointment of an agent to receive serv-
ice of process in order to comply with a statute" or by the appointment
'Ex Pare Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd.,
268 U.S. 619 (1925); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S.
308 (1870); Burton v. Dixon, 259 N.C. 473, 131 S.E.2d 27 (1963); Stanley v. Columbus
State Bank, 258 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; 21 C.J.S. Courts
83b (1940).
'McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1916); Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 1; 14 Am.
Jur. Courts § 167 (1938); 49 C.J.S. judgments § 19b (1940); Restatement, Judgments §
14 (1942).
'Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931); Federal Underwriters Exch.
v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598 (1943); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 85c (1940); Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws § 77d (1934). See Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders,
28 Mo. L. Rev. 336 (1963); The rule is contra with respect to jurisdiction over the subject
matter. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1950); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 85a (1940).
' The leading case regarding nonresident motorist statutes is Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1926). See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2039a (1963). See generally Comment,
Non-Resident Motorist Statutes-Their Current Scope, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 384 (1959).
'Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963). Cf. Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b(4) (1963).
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Note, jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations-An Analysis in Due Process, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 381 (1955).
'See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031a (1963).
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of such an agent in a freely negotiated contract! The scope of this
note is limited to the case in which a nonresident consents to the jur2-
isdiction of a foreign court over his person by express contractual
agreement.
Rule 4 (d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 and many
state statutes0 expressly authorize the appointment of an agent for
the receipt of service of process. Service upon a lawfully appointed
agent is sufficient to give a court jurisdiction over the person of the
principal whether the principal has actual notice of the service or
not.1 This result is reached with the aid of two legal fictions: (1) the
"legal identity" of the principal and agent and (2) the conclusive
presumption that the agent has communicated his notice or knowl-
edge of the service to the principal. The usual justifications advanced
for these fictions are that the principal should not be allowed to avoid
service of process by acting vicariously" and that third parties deal-
ing with the agent are entitled to rely upon his knowledge and no-
tice.1" It has been held that if the principal fails to extract a promise
from the agent to forward notice, he assumes the risk of not receiv-
ing actual notice." Under elementary principles of contract law, if
8 Kenny Constr. Co. v. Allen, 248 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Bowles v. J. J. Schmitt
& Co., 170 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1948); Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp. v. Callander
Distrib. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348,
174 N.E. 706 (1931); Green Mountain College v. Levine, 120 Vt. 332, 139 A.2d 822
(1958).
OFed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) "Summons: Personal Service.... Service shall be made as follows:
"(1) . . . by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment . . . to receive service of process."
"See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1018(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 508.07 (1905); Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 506.150(1) (1949); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 318.
"Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Szabo v.
Keeshin Motor Express Co., 10 F.R.D. 275 (E.D. Ohio 1950); 2 Mechem, Agency § 1803
(2d ed. 1914); 2 Moore, Federal Practice § 4.12 (2d ed. 1953); Restatement (Second),
Agency § 275 (1958); Restatement, Judgments § 18 (1942); Restatement, Conflict of
Laws § 81, Illustration 5 (1934): "A appoints an agent in state X and authorizes him to
receive service of process in any action brought against A in a court of X. B brings an ac-
tion against A in a court of X and process is served upon the agent. The court has jurisdic-
tion over A." See Burdick, Service as a Requirement in Actions In Personam, 20 Mich. L.
Rev. 422 (1921).
"lVictory v. State, 138 Tex. 285, 158 S.W.2d 760 (1942); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency S
262 (1962); Ferson, Principles of Agency § 100 (1954). Ferson terms the doctrine of im-
puted notice or knowledge an aspect of respondeat superior. Ferson op. cit. supra at § 101.
See Seavey, Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1916).
"
2 Bowen v. Mt. Vernon Say. Bank, 105 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Annot., 104
A.L.R. 1246 (1936).
"'In re Distilled Spirits, 78 U.S. 356 (1870); 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency 5 274 (1962)
and cases cited therein.
'" Kenny Constr. Co. v. Allen, 248 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Green Mountain College
v. Levine, 120 Vt. 332, 139 A.2d 822 (1958). See Phillips v. Garramone, 36 Misc. 2d 1041,
233 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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the principal does extract such a promise and the agent fails to for-
ward notice, he has recourse against the agent."
II. NATIONAL EQUIP. RENTAL, LTD. V. SZUKHENT"'
Plaintiff was a corporate lessor of farm machinery with its prin-
cipal place of business in New York City. The defendants, two farm-
ers who resided in Michigan, leased farm machinery from the plain-
tiff under an agreement which contained a specific and unconcealed
provision that "the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg, ...
Long Island City, N. Y., as agent for the purpose of accepting serv-
ice of any process within the State of New York." Nothing in the
lease required the agent to notify the defendants of any service of
process which might be made upon her. At the time the defendants
signed the lease they had never "met, seen, or heard of"'8 Mrs. Wein-
berg, and afterwards it was discovered that she was the wife of one
of the officers of plaintiff corporation.
Later, the plaintiff sued the defendants in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York for an alleged de-
fault in rental payments. Copies of the summons and complaint were
served upon the designated agent, Florence Weinberg, who promptly
forwarded them to the defendants by certified mail. The district
court admitted that "abundant, actual notice of the service of pro-
cess was promptly and punctiliously given in a manner that made the
whole position plain to defendants at a glance," but quashed the serv-
ice on the ground that no agency had been created." The district
judge held that in order to appoint Mrs. Weinberg agent for service of
process the defendants should have dealt directly with her and not just
with the plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the
agency was invalid because the defendants had no fair indication of
Mrs. Weinberg's undertaking to act as their agent."0 Both courts also
appeared to base their decisions on the lack of an express provision in
the contract requiring the agent to give notice to the defendants of
the service of process. Both courts, however, disclaimed the applica-
bility of Wuchter v. Pizzutti" (concerning a statutory agency) to
108 Williston, Contracts § 1288 (2d ed. 1937).
17375 U.S. 311 (1964).
"8 Black, J. dissenting in the principal case, 375 U.S. at 319.
"
9 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 30 F.R.D. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"
0 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1963).
21 276 U.S. 13 (1928). Wuchter held that a state nonresident motorist statute which
provided for service on the secretary of state but which contained no provision requiring
the secretary of state to forward notice to the nonresident defendant was a violation of due
process. The Court stated that the enforced acceptance by the defendant of service of
1964]
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contracts which are freely negotiated. The Supreme Court reversed
the holding of the lower courts, holding that if process is served up-
on an unknown but expressly designated agent who, upon receipt of
such process, promptly transmits it to the principal, a valid agency
arises and requirements of due process are met even though the
agency agreement contains no provision requiring notification of the
principal.
III. RATIONALE OF THE DECISION
It was necessary for the court to overcome four obstacles in the
determination of this case: (1) the questionable validity of the
agency itself, (2) the agent's possible conflict of interest, (3) the
"adhesive" nature of the contract, and (4) the failure of the con-
tract to provide for notice to the principal.
A. Validity Of The Agency
The problem which received the most attention from the lower
courts and the dissenters in the Supreme Court was the validity of
the agency itself. The dissenters, in two separate opinions, asserted
that the agency was invalid for a variety of reasons-conflict of in-
terest, the "adhesive" nature of the contract, the failure of the con-
tract to provide for notice to the principal, and the questionable
acceptance of the agency by Mrs. Weinberg.
The majority of the Court disposed of the problem with a state-
ment by Professor Williston: "The principal's authorization may
neither expressly nor impliedly request any expression of assent by
the agent as a condition of the authority, and in such a case any
exercise of power by the agent within the scope of the authorization,
during the term for which it was given, or within a reasonable time
if no fixed term was mentioned, will bind the principal. 22 Even
though the agent had not previously assented to the relationship, the
Court felt that her prompt transmittal of the summons and com-
plaint was an acceptance of her role as agent and made the agency
valid. This seems to be in conformity with the general rule that an
agency relationship may be created by acts or words of the parties
which are consistent with an intent to form such a relationship."3
process upon a state officer would not comply with the due process clause unless the statute
by its terms made it at least reasonably probable that the defendant would receive actual
notice.
222 Williston, Contracts § 274 (3rd ed. 1959).
2Leidy v. Taliaferro, 260 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1953); Ellison v. Hunsinger, 237 N.C.
619, 75 S.E.2d 884 (1953); Restatement (Second), Agency § 26 (1958); 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Agency § 21 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Agency § 21 (1940).
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B. Agent's Conflict Of Interest
Mrs. Weinberg's dual role as both an agent for the defendants and
as a volunteer who performed this service under an agreement with
the plaintiff raised the question of a possible conflict of interest. The
majority view in the principal case was that no conflict was present
because of the limited authority given to the agent and the interest
which both parties had in seeing that timely notice was given to the
defendants. This mutual interest, however, must be evaluated in
light of the questionable validity of the agency because, under the
aforestated "notice to the agent is notice to the principal" fictions,
a valid judgment could be had after service upon a duly appointed
agent acting within the scope of his authority even though the
principal had no notice of the proceedings."4 It is important to note
here, however, that if an agent has a conflict of interest the vicarious
notice presumptions usually are negated and the principal is not
charged with the agent's knowledge.2
C. Adhesive Nature Of The Contract
The court of appeals called the lease a contract of "adhesion"' "
and Mr. Justice Black in his dissent termed it a "standardized form
contract."" These contracts derive the label "adhesive" from their
character. They are unilaterally drafted and offered on a "take it or
leave it" basis to a party who has little, if anything, to say about
the terms."
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bar-
gaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services is
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either
because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural
or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His con-
tractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms
24 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
25 Jacobs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 So.2d 346 (La. Ct. App. 1949); In re Duro's
Estate, 236 Iowa 165, 18 N.W.2d 199 (1945). "Interest adverse to the principal in such a
case clearly should and does disqualify the service agent. To hold otherwise would mani-
festly open a door to fraud." Id. at 201; Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1246 (1936); 2 Mechem,
Agency § 1815 (2d ed. 1914). But see Bowen v. Mt. Vernon Sav. Bank, 105 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1939), holding that the presumption is irrebuttable and cannot be avoided by
showing that the agent did not in fact communicate his knowledge nor by showing that the
agent had such an adverse interest that he would not be likely to communicate his knowl-
edge.
'6 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1963).
27 375 U.S. at 324.
"' Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072,1075
(1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943). "It is hardly likely that these Michigan farmers, hiring farm
equipment, were in any position to dicker over what terms went into the contract they
signed." Black, J. dissenting in the principal case, 375 U.S. at 326.
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understood only in a vague way if at all. Thus, standardized contracts
are frequently contracts of adhesion. . .. "
It has been said that freedom of contract is the inevitable counter-
part of a free enterprise system, but that it now is becoming a one-
sided privilege enabling large concerns to "legislate by contract.""
Despite the principle that courts cannot make contracts for the par-
ties but only can interpret them, courts sometimes have resorted to
the guise of interpretation to protect a contracting party. 1 Generally,
however, courts are reluctant to strike down clauses such as the one
involved in the principal case in the face of settled principles of
contract law." A party whose signature appears on a contract is
presumed to have read it and to understand its terms." Business
expediency requires a signed instrument to bind a party. 4
Mr. Justice Black, in a forceful dissent, emphasized that the con-
tract was not negotiated and afforded no basis for supposing that
the defendants had consented to travel hundreds of miles to New
York to defend a lawsuit brought against them there. Mr. Justice
Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Goldberg, noted
in a separate dissent the apparent lack of real consent to the agree-
ment and added that in the case of so fundamental a right, it should
be made abundantly clear, signatures notwithstanding, that the par-
ties "knowingly and intelligently consented to be sued in another
state." There is little authority on the point at present, but it seems
inevitable that with the increase in the use of standardized contracts
situations will arise which will require the courts to deal with this
fundamental problem in contract law.
" Kessler, supra note 28, at 632.
3 Id. at 630.55 id. at 633; Ehrenzweig, supra note 28, at 1082. See Trammel v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 126 Mont. 400, 253 P.2d 329 (1953).
2Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
Contracts made by mature men who are not wards of the court should, in
the absence of potent objection, be enforced. Pretexts to evade them should
not be sought. Few arguments can exist based on reason or justice or common
morality which can be invoked for the interference with the compulsory
performance of agreements which have been freely made. . . . Unless their
stipulations have a tendency to entangle national or state affairs, their con-
tracts in advance to submit to the process of foreign tribunals partake of their
strictly private business. Id. at 707.
Cf. Kenny Constr. Co. v. Allen, 248 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Green Mountain College
v. Levine, 120 Vt. 332, 137 A.2d 822 (1958). But see Frankfurter, J. dissenting in United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942).
a 1 Williston, Contracts § 90A (3rd ed. 1959).
14"[T]o accommodate the business community the ceremony necessary to vouch for
the deliberate nature of a transaction has to be reduced to the absolute minimum." Kessler,
supra note 28, at 629.
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D. Absence Of Contract Provision Requiring Notice
With regard to the lack of a provision requiring the agent to
notify the principal, the majority concluded that neither state nor
federal law compelled the insertion of such a clause in a freely
negotiated contract. The lack of a notice provision, therefore, would
not go to the validity of the agency;" but a cautious principal should
include such a provision in his agency agreement so that he will have
recourse against the agent if the agent should fail to forward notice.
In the case of a judgment rendered against a principal after service
upon his agent, appointed in a contract of adhesion, who had not
promised to forward notice and who in fact did not forward it, the
majority opinion indicates that the judgment would be valid. How-
ever, the strong dissents by four members of the Court indicate that
in the future the Court may be willing to look behind the agree-
ment to see if it was freely negotiated and if it was not, to hold such
service a denial of due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether service upon a "purported" agent will be binding upon
the principal depends upon two factors-the validity of the agency
and the requirement of due process of law. If at some time before
service is made a valid agency is created, then service upon the agent
is sufficient to bind the principal, at least in a case in which there is
no due process question." Even if no agency exists before service,
one may be created by the very act of the agent giving actual notice
of service to the principal. Furthermore, in a case in which a valid
agency exists, the fact that the principal receives actual notice satisfies
the requirements of due process.
However, the case in which a valid agency has been created before
service but the agent has not agreed to forward notice and gives no
actual notice of the service to the principal presents serious problems.
In this situation, the defendant may not be bound because of a
denial of due process. This might occur either if the contract which
created the agency was one of adhesion" or if the agent had a con-
*"Cf. Bass v. American Prods. Export & Import Corp., 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594
(1923) in which an agency by estoppel was under consideration and it was held that while
the lack of a provision for notice to the principal is not decisive of the validity of the
agency, it is an important consideration in determining the legality of service upon an agent
whose very status as an agent is brought into question.
U See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
37 $ee note 11 supra and accompanying text.
a See text following note 36 supra.
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